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ABSTRACT
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is moving to the forefront of small spacecraft development. The benefits of
SysML as a language for the elucidation of the system architecture for CubeSats is well understood and is
implemented in standard model formats. Concurrently, the benefits of the evolving development of MBSE for
assurance has been recognized and is emerging as Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), which promises the
development of integral assurance stakeholder views into the model as well as the production of useful products from
the model. In this regard, the assurance organizations of NASA, ESA and JAXA are exploring jointly the potential
benefits of MBSE and MBMA in anticipation of future joint projects in which an architecture for a flight mission will be
shared in a SysML model. Traditionally, only mission-critical aspects of large systems have been able to justify the
time and expense of creating reliability analyses. This work aims to make these analyses practical for a wide range of
missions, from small to large to support architectural design decisions, rapidly and cost effectively, across
organizations. In addition to exploring basic modeling concepts and communicating over the model, the partners
have shown that reliability analysis can be generated from the model. These include early Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) based on the simulated mission. The intent is to test basic
meta-model frameworks and compare these results across the agencies. One such basic framework employs SysML
state machines as the basis for developing FMEAs and FTAs. When failures are modeled using this framework, plugins
(developed by NASA under a Small Business Innovation Research project) for the SysML tool are able automatically to
generate a FMECA table and Fault Trees.
The expected outcome of this project is a compilation of lessons learned across the 3 agencies (NASA-ESA-JAXA) to be
shared with their assurance communities. In addition, comparisons and utility of SysML derived products from the
model are planned. Finally, a framework for standardization to the extent possible will be proposed to facilitate model
sharing in the future for more complex scenarios, as a result of lessons learned herein.
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MBMA is integration of Mission Assurance products Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS) with System Engineering
Model (SysML Model).
BENEFITS OF MBMA:
 Speed – reliability artifacts can be rapidly produced, and thus the results of reliability studies and analyses
can be fed back to system engineers in a timely manner
 Correctness – automatic derivation of artifacts directly form system models ensures they are correct and
complete with respect to those models
 Expertise – by relieving reliability engineers from manual construction of reliability artifacts, their time and
effort can be put to valued use to provide insights and guidance to system engineers
APPLICATION OF MBMA TO CUBESAT PROJECT
The CubeSat model was created, and failures and the effects of the failures were added to
the model from ESA Space Product Assurance Standard, Annex G Failure Modes, Effects




State Machine can have
one or more States
Each State has Activity 
on entering the State
Use Send Signal Action 
to send either Failure 
Mode, Effect or nominal 
state transition signals
Use Call Behavior Action 
to trigger the affected 
system components
Each State Machine has 
Transition Triggers and 
Guards
MODELING FAILURE MODES (META-MODEL)
CONCLUSION
A modeling methodology was developed to extend the system model (in SysML) with failure mode
information. The methodology was applied to an example CubeSat’s power system as the most critical
system for the CubeSat. The benefit of this application is the ability to rapidly perform reliability analyses
such as Fault Trees and a FMECA table, demonstrating that system reliability can be analyzed in the early
design stage of the project. Model Based Mission Assurance, of which this is an example, aims to be
applicable to a wide range of missions, from small satellites to large systems, to support and analyze
designs in a fast and effective manner.
Fault Tree generated for No Bus Power effect, showing all  
propagated failures starting with a cause of the failure. 
The propagation path for the Kill Switch Stuck Off failure 
mode is circled.
MODELING FAILURE MODES EXAMPLE
FAULT TREE PLUGIN OUTPUT
FMECA PLUGIN OUTPUT
FMECA table generated for Power Bus, showing the failure propagation path, end effect, and likelihood of each failure mode.
 Kill Switch is modeled as a <<Block>> that owns Stuck Off signal with <<Failure Mode>> stereotype, Unable
to Disconnect Bus Power signal with <<Effect>> stereotype and Kill Switch Failure Modes state machine with
Mechanical Failure – Stuck Off signal.
 Kill Switch state machine diagram shows transition (with <<Failure>> stereotype) from nominal to failed
(Stuck Off) state using Mechanical Failure – Stuck Off signal as a trigger.
 The Enter Stuck Off activity diagram (entry behavior for Stuck Off failed state) declares the failure mode,
Stuck Off and its effect, Unable to Connect Bus Power using send signal actions.
 The effect of Kill Switch Stuck Off failure, Unable to Connect Bus Power will trigger the transition for the
Power Bus state machine from nominal to failed (Kill Switch Failure – Locked Off) state.
 Use the Fault Tree plugin to generate the list of failure mode effects.
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For components with 
redundancy, Guard 
conditions are used along 
with propagation signals. 
In this example, the 
Power Bus draws power 
from Battery and Solar 
Cells, so both upstream 
components must fail for 
this transition to occur.
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